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LEGAL ETHICS AND NON-PRACTICING




The symposium invited me to speak on the legal ethical issues
that face counsel who represent non-practicing entities ("NPEs") in
patent litigation as plaintiff patentees. My first reaction was that,
although obviously the same common law, statutes, ethical rules, and
procedural rules apply to such counsel as any other, owing to the
tremendous costs of patent litigation, that counsel who represented
such a "troll" necessarily would have enhanced obligations to court
and opposing counsel to ensure that the suit was not brought in bad
faith, nor so conducted.
Upon analysis, however, I came to the somewhat counter-
intuitive conclusion that, although the NPE's counsel owes somewhat
heightened duties, it is in fact the lawyer for the defendant, the
accused infringer, whose duties are most implicated by the presence
of an NPE in a patent suit. I arrived at that those twin conclusions
based upon the following analysis and with some surprise.
After providing a very brief discussion of NPEs, the article turns
to legal and ethical issues. The article is organized in roughly a
chronological order, analyzing the ethical and legal obligations that
counsel for an NPE face in investigating, filing, and litigating a suit.
In each section, it explains the applicable law and then applies that
law to the context of NPE litigation, analyzing how the presence of an
NPE affects the duties of counsel for both the patentee and the
accused infringer.
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* The title is from "The Receiving End" from the CD John Wesley Harding Sings to a
Small Guitar Volume 2.
f Professor Hricik is the author of PATENT ETHICS: LITIGATION (Oxford Univ. Press
2010) and other books and articles on ethical issues in patent prosecution and litigation.
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B. SOME PERTINENT OBSERVATIONS ABOUT NPEs
The laws governing issuance of patents do not distinguish
between a patent issued to a large manufacturing corporation and one
that issues to a solo inventor who has neither the wherewithal or
desire to manufacture. All patents are issued as equals, giving the
owner the right to exclude as codified in the patent statutes. One
commentator stated this basic proposition:
Since as early as the ratification of the United States Constitution,
a patent holder has had an exclusive right to his patent. The
Founding Fathers believed that such an exclusive right would
"scarcely be questioned" and that such a right was not only
beneficial for the inventor, but equally so for the public good.
In other words, an NPE is entitled to a patent on the same terms
as is a large manufacturer. Indeed, prior practices in other countries to
award patents to employers, guilds, and others, rather than to
inventors, were rejected by our Founding Fathers who believed that
any patent should go to its creator. 2
Nor does the Patent Act prevent an individual from suing a large
manufacturer who infringes a patent despite the fact that the
individual has no actual damages in the form of lost profits.' While it
may be more difficult post-eBay for an NPE to obtain an injunction
against a manufacturing defendant,4  a reasonable royalty and an
injunction are obviously available remedies.' Every patent includes
"the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention." 6
Despite these facts and settled principles, many people attack
NPEs, characterizing them as "trolls" who abuse the patent system
rather than further its goals. PricewaterhouseCoopers recently
analyzed damages in patent cases and showed that, whatever the Bar
or courts think of NPEs, juries and judges believe in and follow the
1. Paul M. Mersino, Patents, Trolls and Personal Property: Will eBay Auction Away a
Patent Holder's Right to Exclude?, 6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 307, 307 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
2. See generally In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967,976-77 (Fed. CiT. 2009).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). E.g., Wahl v. Carrier Mfg. Co., 511 F.2d 209, 214 (7th Cir.
1975).
4. See generally Mersino, supra note 1, at 308.
5. See Todd Klein, eBay v. MercExchange and KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: The
Supreme Court Wages War Against Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 307-08 (2007).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
7. There are countless examples in the literature calling non-practicing entities "trolls"
and the like.
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patent laws described above.8 Specifically, the study found that
judges award median damages to NPEs in about the same amount as
practicing entities, and juries award significantly more.9
So the playing field, at least in the courtroom, is level. What of
course are not level are the costs that an NPE might incur in litigation
when compared to that of a practicing entity. A practicing entity
obviously will have significantly more documents subject to
discovery requests, and as a result also incur significantly more costs
responding to electronic discovery demands. An NPE does not have
employees whose time is taken away by deposition preparation,
searching for documents and responsive information, answering
discovery, and preparing for trial. And, a party that does not
manufacture products cannot be the subject of a counterclaim for
infringing a patent owned by the defendant.
An NPE can, by filing an infringement suit, impose significant
costs on a practicing entity. Simply put, the legal playing field is
level, but the practical one is not.
C. ETHICS AND THE NPE
1. A Brief Caveat About Choice ofLaw
The law discussed in this article may be different in other
jurisdictions.' 0 While patent cases must be appealed to the Federal
Circuit," Federal Circuit law does not apply to all issues in patent
cases. Foremost, regional circuit law applies to "procedural" issues,
but Federal Circuit law applies to "patent" issues.12 More specifically,
the Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law to procedural matters
"that are not unique to patent issues,"' but it applies its own law to
8. See CHRIS BARRY ET AL., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE CONTINUED
EVOLUTION OF PATENT DAMAGES LAW: PATENT LITIGATION TRENDS 1995-2009 AND THE
IMPACT OF RECENT COURT DECISIONS ON DAMAGES 12-15 (2010), available at
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/20 I 0-patent-litigation-
study.pdf.
9. Id. at I1.
10. See generally DAVID HRICIK, PATENT ETHICS: LITIGATION (Oxford Univ. Press
2010). Much of this discussion comes from PATENT ETHICS: LITIGATION.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006). See, e.g., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vomado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
12. See Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1359-60 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
13. Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
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procedural matters that "are related to patent issues."' 4
The division between issues "unique to patent law" and those
that are not can be critical. In its latest pronouncements, the Federal
Circuit stated that a procedural issue is subject to Federal Circuit law
if it (1) "pertain[s] to" the substance of a patent right, (2) "bear[s] an
essential relationship to matters committed to [the Federal Circuit's]
exclusive control by statute," or (3) "clearly implicate[s] the
jurisprudential responsibilities of [the Federal Circuit] in a field
within its exclusive jurisdiction."15
The Federal Circuit has so far held that ethical issues are not
unique to patent law and has applied the law of the proper regional
circuit.' 6 Accordingly, for instance, a lawyer litigating a case in Texas
must consult the approach of the Fifth Circuit, while a litigator in
federal court in New York consults the law of the Second Circuit, and
so on. While a complete canvas of the varying approaches that federal
courts apply to the choice of law issue can form the basis of its own
book, this example of two circuits illustrates the range.
For the foregoing reasons, it is possible that a specific court
facing an actual problem could take a very different approach to the
issues discussed in this article. However, for the most part, the issues
presented in this article implicate central and fairly uniformly
interpreted laws and rules. Nonetheless, care must always be given to
choice of law, since a court may require more than this article
suggests.
2. Pre-Suit Investigations
Various rules, federal statutes, and state substantive law (in the
form of claims for malicious prosecution and the like) require that
lawyers not invoke the power of any court without good reason.17
This section summarizes four principal sources of a lawyer's
obligations of inquiry and investigation commonly raised in patent
S lt.18suits.
The purposes behind requiring pre-suit investigations are many
and include weeding out frivolous claims and defenses, reducing the
scope of the controversy, and eliminating unnecessary disputes over
14. Id. at 1575 n.14.
15. Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 274 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
16. Sun Studs, Inc. v. Applied Theory Assocs., Inc., 772 F.2d 1557, 1566 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
17. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11; 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).
18. See HRICIK, supra note 10.
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facts.' 9 But pre-suit and pre-answer investigations would no doubt
occur even without legal requirement since litigation is expensive.
Because counsel for both parties are generally interested in prevailing,
asserting meritless claims or defenses is generally perceived to
indicate weakness, not strength. To do so can diminish the value of
strong claims or defenses.20
The focus of this article is on ethics. The principal ethical rule
that pertains to pre-suit investigations is Model Rule 3.1, which
provides in pertinent part: "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a
basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes
a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of
existing law."2 A comment to the rule explains:
The filing of an action or defense or similar action taken for a
client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been
fully substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital
evidence only by discovery. What is required of lawyers, however,
is that they inform themselves about the facts of their clients' cases
and the applicable law and determine that they can make good
faith arguments in support of their clients' positions. Such action is
not frivolous even though the lawyer believes that the client's
position ultimately will not prevail. The action is frivolous,
however, if the lawyer is unable either to make a good faith
argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action
taken by a good faith a ument for an extension, modification or
reversal of existing law.
Prior to 2006, the Model Rule expressly stated that an action was
frivolous if the client acted "primarily for the purpose of harassing or
maliciously injuring a person."23 However, the language remains in
some state versions 24 of Rule 3.1 today. In my experience, despite its
deletion, courts consider all circumstances in determining whether an
action was-or was not-frivolous, including indicia of bad faith.
19. See, e.g., Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(explaining that reasonable pre-suit inquiry into claim interpretation and application of claims to
accused products is required to avoid frivolous filings).
20. See Robert B. Fitzpatrick, Plaintiffs Pre-Trial Strategies, in BASIC EMPLOYMENT
AND LABOR LAW - IN DEPTH: ALl-ABA COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS (1996).
21. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2010).
22. Id. at cmt. 2.
23. See ABA, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1982-2005 424 (2006).
24. E.g., MASS. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT 3.1 (2011); GEORGIA R. PROF'L CONDUCT 3.1
(2010).
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Although there is no "empty head pure heart" defense to a violation of
Rule 3.1, the test is objective and an evil heart can make a difference,
particularly in close cases.
Before turning to how this ethical rule applies to suits by NPE-
patentees, the article briefly summarizes the other law applicable to
pre-suit investigations, since the ethical rules are only a small part of
the body of law that requires pre-suit investigations.
a. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
First, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
part:
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper
must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's
name-or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented. The
paper must state the signer's address, e-mail address, and
telephone number. Unless a rule or statute specifically states
otherwise, a pleading need not be verified or accompanied by an
affidavit. The court must strike an unsigned paper unless the
omission is promptly corrected after being called to the attorney's
or party's attention.
(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the court a
pleading, written motion, or other paper-whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating it-an attorney or
unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as
to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the
cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for
establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support
after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based
on belief or a lack of information.25
25. FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
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As with all suits filed in federal court, before a patent suit can be
filed, a lawyer must comply with Rule 11 by conducting an adequate
pre-suit investigation as to the law and facts underlying the
allegations of infringement in the complaint.26 So, too, a defendant
must investigate in compliance with Rule 11 before filing a motion or
pleading in response to a patent infringement suit.2 7 Because of the
stakes often involved, as well as the complexity often associated with
patent suits, however, it often takes significant effort in terms of time
and money to comply.
The Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law to motions for
28
sanction under Rule 11, since they are not unique to patent law.
Courts hold that a frivolous claim or pleading for Rule 11 purposes is
one that was "legally or factually 'baseless' from an objective
perspective" and was made without "a reasonable and competent
inquiry."2 Thus, if the pleading or other paper was not objectively
baseless, then the amount of inquiry is irrelevant; it is only if the
pleading or paper was objectively baseless that the reasonableness of
the factual and legal investigation matters.30
b. Exceptional Case Attorney Fee Shifting Under 35
U.S.C. § 285
Second, Section 285 provides that a "court in exceptional cases
may award reasonable attorneys' fees to the prevailing party."3 The
statute authorizes fee shifting-awarding the accused infringer its
attorneys' fees, for example-where the prevailing party establishes
that the suit was "objectively baseless." 32 "Exceptional case" liability
can be imposed against the patentee or accused infringer. A patentee
26. See, e.g., Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
View Eng'g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2000). See also Eon-
Net, L.P. v. Flagstar Bancorp, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 609, 614 (W.D. Wash. 2006) ("Rule 11 is not
about 'after-the-fact investigation,' and consulting with experts after filing to craft 'colorable'
arguments does not cure a Rule 11 violation." (quoting Judin v. U.S., 110 F.3d 780, 785 (Fed.
Cir. 1997))).
27. Rule 11 applies to all pleadings and signed documents, not just those of the plaintiff.
See FED. R. Civ. P. I1.
28. Q-Pharma, 360 F.3d at 1299.
29. Christian v. Mattel, Inc., 286 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002).
30. See, e.g., Eon-Net, 239 F.R.D. at 609 (imposing sanctions under Rule II for
inadequate pre-suit investigation).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).
32. See Q-Pharma, 360 F.3d at 1295.
33. Exceptional cases can involve bad faith litigation by either party, inequitable conduct
by the patentee, or willful infringement by the accused infringer. See Brasseler, U.S.A. I, L.P. v.
Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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who files an infringement suit can be liable for "exceptional case"
damages if the patentee's actions are "manifestly unreasonable in
assessing infringement." 34 Significantly, liability can be imposed
even if the patentee files suit but then voluntarily dismisses it.3 5
The Federal Circuit applies its own law to liability under Section
285, since it is unique to patent law.3 6 Exceptional cases include those
involving "inequitable conduct before the [Patent and Trademark
Office]; misconduct during litigation, vexatious or unjustified
litigation, and frivolous suit." 37 If even one type of conduct is present,
the district court must "weigh intangible as well as tangible factors:
the degree of culpability of the infringer, the closeness of the
question, litigation behavior, and any other factors whereby fee
shifting may serve as an instrument of justice."
c. Liability Under the Federal Antitrust Laws
Third, antitrust liability can arise, and a patentee can be found
liable for bad faith litigation or bad faith enforcement or publicity of a
patent in rare circumstances.3 9 Likewise, in some circumstances, an
affirmative claim for relief, under state law or federal antitrust laws,
can arise through enforcement of an invalid or unenforceable patent
for other forms of litigation involving patents.4 0
The Federal Circuit applies regional circuit law to antitrust
claims since they are not unique to patent law. 4 1 Although a full
discussion of the federal antitrust laws is beyond the scope of this
article, some general principles relate directly to the issue of pre-suit
inquiry. For example, the accused infringer may prove that the
34. Eltech Sys. Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 903 F.2d 805, 809-10 (Fed. Cir. 1990). See
Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 947 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (finding case
exceptional).
35. See Micromesh Technology Corp. v. American Recreation Products, Inc., No. C-06-
6030 MHP., 2007 WL 2501783, (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2007).
36. Q-Pharma, 360 F.3d at 1299; Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d
1358, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
37. Superior Fireplace Co., 270 at 1377 (quoting Multiform Desiccants, Inc., v. Mcdzam
Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1481-82 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); see Brooks Furn. Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int'l,
Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (describing additional forms of conduct that can violate
Section 285).
38. Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76 F.3d 1185, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
Superior Fireplace Co., 270 F.3d at 1377; see Modine Mfg. Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d
538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (similar test).
39. See Q-Pharma, 360 F.3d at 1295.
40. See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (state law and
antitrust counterclaims filed arising out of disputed result in interference proceeding).
41. See Filmtec Corp. v. Hydranautics, 67 F.3d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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asserted patent was obtained through "Walker Process" fraud-that
is, knowing and willful fraud.42 Or, the accused infringer may prove
that the earlier suit was "a mere sham to cover what is actually
nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the business
relationships of a competitor." 4 3 Thus, under rare circumstances, a
patentee may need to examine the file history if it has red flag
warnings of serious wrongdoing.
d. Liability Under State Law and Other Federal Statutes
Fourth, actions in federal court can give rise to state law claims
for malicious prosecution and the like.4 Obviously, the existence and
scope of these torts vary by state, and a particularized discussion is
beyond the scope of this article. In addition to Rule 11, other laws
inspired by tort reform efforts can require pre-suit investigation as
well.45
Likewise, other federal statutes in rare circumstances can apply
to patent suits. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides that any
person "admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States ... who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably
and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the
excess costs, expenses and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred
because of such conduct." 4 6 Where multiple suits are filed without
basis, violations of Section 1927 have been found, but the cases are
not common.4 7
42. Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, Inc., 141 F.3d 1059, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1998)
(citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965)).
43. Id. (quoting E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127
(1960)).
44. See Dominant Semiconductors SDN. BHD. v Osram GMBH, 524 F.3d 1254 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (discussing liability for bad faith litigation and bad faith publicity of patent rights);
Taurus IP, LLC v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 559 F. Supp. 2d 947 (W.D. Wis. 2008) (analyzing
award of attorneys' fees for breach of contract action related to patent infringement suit); Verve,
LLC v. Hypercom Corp., No. CV-05-0365-PHX-FJM, 2006 WL 2390505 (D. Ariz. Aug. 16,
2006) (discussing claims for malicious prosecution and abuse of process for filing patent suit
under Arizona state law); PSN Ill., Inc. v. Ivoclar Vivadent, Inc., No. 04 C 7232, 2005 WL
2347209 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2005) (analyzing counterclaims to infringement suit under state and
federal law). See also Carter v. Ozoeneh, No. 3:0tv614-R3C, 2009 WL 3003836 (W.D. N.C.
Sept. 16, 2009) (claims by former client that current litigation was actionable).
The assertion of state law claims can implicate preemption and related doctrines. See Zenith
Elec. Corp. v. Exzec, Inc., 182 F.3d 1340, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Pro-Mold and Tool Co. v.
Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
45. See, e.g., Hinchman v. Gillette, 618 S.E.2d 387 (W.Va. 2005) (contrasting statutory
pre-suit certificate with state version of Rule 11 in separation of powers challenge).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).
47. Verve, LLC, 2006 WL 2390505 (concluding that attorney violated Section 1927 in
801
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e. Application of Ethical Rules Concerning Pre-Suit
Investigations to NPE Suits: Heightened
Responsibilities?
NPEs lack the competitive benefit that practicing entities have in
filing suit and may find their motives more closely scrutinized than
counsel for a practicing patentee. The suit is entirely economic-
royalty-seeking-and not based upon business interests independent
of obtaining damages. In addition, courts (and opposing counsel) are
aware of the leverage that the mere filing of a patent infringement suit
creates, and are also aware that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted will likely fail, subjecting the accused infringer
to the costs of litigation necessary to file for summary judgment.
Counsel for an NPE take into account the attitude of some courts
towards NPE suits and perhaps engage in more extensive pre-suit
infringement investigation than might otherwise be necessary. Absent
unusual circumstances, however, the investigation needed by counsel
for a patentee-NPE will concern proof of infringement, not validity or
enforceability of the patent. 48 Nonetheless, and particularly in districts
that require early disclosure of infringement contentions by local rule
or otherwise, counsel for NPEs should be sure to carefully apply the
claims to the accused products. While claim charts generally are not
required at a pre-suit stage, counsel for an NPE should consider that,
in order to protect themselves and their client from sanctions and
other charges, vigilance in pre-suit infringement investigations is
particularly warranted.
Nonetheless, the ethical obligation of defense counsel is also
heightened when an NPE is the patentee-plaintiff. It is good practice
for counsel to always analyze infringement early on in order to
determine whether the plain language of the claims negates
infringement or conduct during prosecution creates an estoppel or
other limitation on the claims that precludes infringement. Defense
patent suit). See also Baldwin Hardware Corp. v. Franksu Enterp. Corp., 78 F.3d 550 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (affirming award based on litigation misconduct); Defendant's Answer, Great Am. Ins.
Co. v. Godwin Pappas Ronquillo, LLP, No. 3-07CV1727-N, 2008 WL 1881320 (N.D. Tex.
March 6, 2008) (pleading involving insurance coverage dispute over sanctions in prior patent
infringement case).
48. Validity and enforceability are of course essentially presumed, and so absent
knowledge by the patentee or its counsel of significant questions as to validity or enforceability,
little to no investigation is required. On the other hand, patentee's counsel should ensure that the
plaintiff is in fact owner of the patent and that the patent is in force. See HRICIK, supra note 10,
at 95-96, 101-03.
HeinOnline  -- 27 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L. J. 802 2010-2011
2011] LEGAL ETHICS AND NON-PRACTICING ENTITIES
counsel should demand that NPE counsel describe infringement early
since the asymmetry of discovery costs means that the NPE can cause
the accused infringer to incur attorneys' fees in proportionately
greater amount. Early and vigorous analysis of infringement
contentions may lead to early settlement or the grant of summary
judgment. In that regard, counsel for the defendant should analyze
whether the court will permit limited discovery and motion practice
on infringement prior to engaging in broader discovery as a means to
protect the accused infringer from unnecessary attorneys' fees, costs,
and delay.
3. Fairness in Discovery
Under applicable ethical rules, lawyers may not serve frivolous
discovery, 49 and in federal court they may not, under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, serve discovery for an improper purpose,
which includes "needlessly increas[ing] the cost of litigation," or
which is unreasonably burdensome in light of the stakes in the case.5 o
As noted above, an NPE will in most cases have significantly
fewer documents or witnesses and employees that are pertinent to a
suit than will a practicing entity. Particularly where expensive
electronic discovery is likely, the asymmetry in expenses can be
significant. These asymmetries create the potential for abuse that
counsel for both the NPE and for the accused infringer need to
analyze.
As to counsel for the NPE, the temptation to use the cost of
discovery, and particularly of e-discovery 51 as a means to extract a
settlement is evident. An NPE may have few, if any, responsive
documents apart from the file histories and a few documents
pertaining to ownership and maintenance of the patent, while the
patentee very likely will have countless documents pertaining to
damages alone. For these reasons, counsel for NPE-patentees have a
greater incentive to engage in abusive discovery practices as a means
of driving up costs to force settlement.
Counsel for accused infringers are not without their own ethical
dilemmas. As one commentator noted, a factor in the expense of
49. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(d) (2009) (prohibiting a lawyer from
knowingly "in pretrial procedure, mak[ing] a frivolous discovery request. . .
50. FED. R. CIv. P. 26.
51. See generally John Prudhomee, Discovery in the Paperless World: How Speed and
Ease of Technology Has Slowed and Complicated the Process, 14 SMU Sa. & TECH. L. REV.
159 (2010).
803
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electronic discovery, in particular, is the fact that "many lawyers bill
by the hour."52 Again, this necessitates that defense counsel carefully
scrutinize discovery requests and consider whether bifurcating the
proceedings into stages will save the client money-even if it reduces
the income to the lawyer. For example, bifurcating the case first into
an inquiry regarding infringement of the patent-which turns
primarily on the claim language itself and comparison of the
construed claims to the accused products-will eliminate the need to
examine validity, enforceability, or damages. Defense counsel's
aggressive pursuit of limitations on discovery and of other means to
reduce costs can benefit the accused infringer enormously.
D. CONCLUSION: ONUS ON DEFENSE COUNSEL?
The patent laws give NPEs the same right to exclude as all
patentees possess. Only Congress can change that fact. The realities
thus remain, for counsel for both NPEs and for accused infringers,
that the costs of litigation will be greater on the defendant. While the
NPE must not seek frivolous discovery, the problem that defense
counsel faces is that even complying with legitimate discovery
requests can result in substantial and disproportionate costs to the
accused infringer.
The only actor in the suit who has the responsibility and power
to stop abuse and even to manage the case in a way that protects the
client from unnecessary costs is defense counsel. By promptly and
actively seeking a basis for judgment of noninfringement, or for
otherwise limiting or bifurcating discovery, defense counsel can
reduce the costs of litigation and protect the court and his client from
even warranted costs.
The problem is that many counsel bill by the hour. There is an
inherent tension between the interests of defense counsel, paid by the
hour, and their clients, that is heightened by the presence of an NPE.
In some respects, the NPE's interests in avoiding early adjudication
coincide with defense counsel's interests in gaining a fee.
As a result, counsel for both parties to NPE litigation have
heightened obligations to avoid unnecessary costs and take active
steps to expedite litigation. The ethical obligations fall not only on the
NPE's counsel, but also on the lawyer representing the receiving end
of the suit.
52. Id. at 159.
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